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the Pakistan and Afghanistan region remain vital. As we begin the process of transitioning security, governance, and development to the Afghan government we must not allow our internal organizations, agencies, departments, and international partners to become complacent or confused about our intentions in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. As such, the U.S. must relook its policy regarding Pakistan, particularly as security threats in Pakistan remain real and increase in capacity and capability. Central to this effort is the requirement for U.S. policy makers to understand the influence that Pakistan wields in the region and how they will directly influence long term stability in the region and beyond. The salient national objective associated with this strategy is to continue the disruption, dismantling, and defeat of Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and prevent their return to Afghanistan. The question is how do we do that with a fragile and sometimes unpredictable government structure in Pakistan? This paper examines this question and provides recommendations for policy makers to consider pertaining to this dynamic national security challenge.
U.S. POLICY IN PAKISTAN AS U.S. BEGINS TO TRANSITION AFGHANISTAN?
…I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda ….
-President Barack Obama 1 President Obama's sentiments as communicated in the above sited quote clearly convey the nation's strategic end state with regard to Al Qaeda. 2 While there has been a steady degradation in Al-Qaeda, and the ability of other terror groups to effectively conduct operations within Afghanistan and Pakistan, their capacity, capabilities, and credibility remain a persistent threat in the region. The U.S. is constantly reminded of Al Qaeda's ability to project terror and to adjust their targets and tactics to meet objectives based on political and military atmospherics emanating from inside Pakistan.
Security threats in Pakistan remain real and are growing in capacity and capability. Specific threats in Pakistan from Al-Qaeda and other international terrorists are of most concern. Recent examples of this dynamic include, the September 2008 suicide bombing on Marriott Hotel in Islamabad that killed 53 people. Soon after this attack, the government of Pakistan launched a major offensive in the Bajaur tribal area, killing more than 1,000 militants. 3 The January 2010 -suicide attack on a volleyball match in the north-west region of the country that killed more than 100 people is yet another example. Finally in January 2011 Al-Qaeda launched a campaign to reform Pakistan's blasphemy law that led to the killing of two prominent supporters, Punjab
Governor Salman Taseer in January, and Minorities Minister Shahbaz Bhatti in March.
Al-Qaeda continues to plan new attacks on the U.S., Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Europe, Australia, and throughout the Middle East. 4 
Facts and Assumptions
There are some important facts and assumptions that assist in framing the analysis associated with the development of policy and strategy options with regards to Pakistan and the region. These facts and assumptions are based on historical facts and tendencies demonstrated by Pakistan and other state and non-state actors of interests.
To begin with, a military takeover in Pakistan is always a very real possibility. The military has a proven track record of stepping in when it feels the country is at risk of becoming a failed state. The military ruled from 1958 to 1971, 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2008, for a total of thirty-three of the sixty four years since the country came into existence. 5 The average length of a government under political parties or civilian control is 7.5 years. The current government has been in power for about four years now, so based on averages, history and the current political environment within Pakistan the military is due to take over in about four years, and will hold power for eleven years until the political system has a chance to regenerate and become capable of taking over the government and establishing institutions within the country.
Another key assumption is that a stable government in Pakistan will remain a vital U.S. national interest and the nation will remain a source of friction and frustration for U.S. politicians and military leaders. In fact it has become such a source of concern that the U.S. has decided to rely on India in lieu of Pakistan as the anchor of our diplomatic efforts in the region. According to Lawrence Wright's article in the May edition of The New Yorker, "India has become the democratic and tolerant country that the United States tried to create in Pakistan with billions of dollars in aid and three serial military alliances." 6 Finally, Pakistan will muddle along for the next 7-10 years. 7 As a result, the Pakistan is in a state of crisis and is quickly becoming one of the international community's greatest concerns. Pakistan is a country with 169 million people and expected to grow between 250 and 335 million by 2050; this will make it the fifth largest country in the world. 9 Given these numbers in growth, Pakistan's lack of capacity with regards to vital resources such as education, healthcare, and energy sources is a major concern. Likewise the economy is challenged and will not be able to absorb the employment requirements of the growing population. Additionally there is a lack of human capital such as, educators, professional field of doctors, administrators, scientist, and educated women, who currently represent the majority of population growth. For
Pakistan to develop it must accommodate such a growth if it is to be viable and robust. Currently, this option is unattainable and is not attractive to Pakistanis in general.
The fourth scenario is much more moderate and centers on the establishment of a Liberal Democracy, but not in the strict sense of "liberal" from a western perspective. The underlying sentiment associated with the benign school of thought, is that Pakistan will once again have to deal with the consequences of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan alone. The mood from the benign camp is that Pakistan is only protecting its long term interest and setting conditions that will allow them to deal with a post U.S.
intervention condition in Afghanistan.
The second school of thought centers on the belief that Pakistan is a "malign actor" and is exploiting the U.S. by allowing them to commit resources, and political energy, while simultaneously undermining their efforts in the region. 29 The Pakistan build on its own success against militants to eliminate extremist sanctuaries that threaten the wider region, and the United States. 33 The KLB bill also goes on to address specific security requirements that the U.S. Impacts of a Changing U.S. Strategy
The Department of Defense (DoD) is in a period of transition. 35 During this transition we are most vulnerable to a global perception of weakness, losing focus on our national interest and goals, and potentially abandoning our allies and partners throughout the globe where in fact it could not be further from reality. As we take the first steps toward turning the strategic corner we need to understand how DoD is going to evolve in a post war environment that is fiscally challenged, and that remains full of complex threats from multiple non-state and state actors that are determined to disrupt global economical prosperity while continuing to threaten U.S interest, allies, partners, and the homeland.
Now that Iraq and Afghanistan are on the path toward stability and U.S. interests in the region are reasonably secure, the U.S. has begun the process of responsibly drawing down forces in both countries and focusing on preparing for future challenges.
The Secretary of Defense along with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretaries of the Military
Departments, and the Combatant Commanders have outlined the challenges that will now shape U.S. strategy to ensure the military will have the focus and the tools to protect U.S. national security interest, rebalance and reform defense initiatives and programs all to support the national security imperative of deficit reduction. 36 Within the new strategic priorities there are several areas of concern that may inadvertently widen the trust deficit that currently exists between the U.S. and Pakistan.
The most critical is a new focus on a broader range of challenges and opportunities including security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific and the Middle East where U.S.
economic and security interest are "inextricably linked to developments in the arc extending from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the India Ocean region and South Asia." 37 The second is even more open for speculation from the Pakistani point of view, as the U.S. has decided to invest in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region. 38 These shifts in policy will force Pakistan to reexamine its relationship with the U.S. and India in an effort to determine where they might fit into the larger economic and security picture within the region. In short Pakistan will be looking for indicators of U.S. withdraw of funding and support. Pakistan could come to the conclusion that the U.S. now views them as a strategic and political liability in the region and it is time to move on and allow Pakistan to struggle and force them to seek out new partners with deep pockets and vital interest in the area such as China or Russia.
What the United States must do now is over communicate with Pakistan, Afghanistan, our competitors, and adversaries by ensuring them that our partnership remains intact and that we have no plans to abandon U.S interest in the region. We need to emphasize our commitment to defeating Al-Qaida no matter where they are, by deterring and defeating aggression where it resides and by strengthen partnerships.
Most importantly we must be able to demonstrate that even with a reduced physical presence we can still decisively deliver lethal and non-lethal effects to secure U.S. vital interest.
Convincing Pakistan and others in the region is going to be a great challenge over the next few years, and we must continually engage the leadership and the population of Pakistan or non-state threats will capitalize in our absence. We will be required to maintain those allies and partnerships that we have developed since WWII, but on the other hand we must now reach out into areas where we have indentified new opportunities that support U.S interest. We must meet our obligations to the past and approach the future through a "Smart Power" approach. 39 How to Employ Smarter Power 40 Since 2001, many theorists, national security professionals and academics have suggested that the current U.S. effort in the region is dominated by the military instrument of national power. To date, the Department of Defense has been relied on more than any other element of power, and has provided rapid and visible solutions to very complex problems. Now more than ever it is critical for the U.S. to integrate all the elements of National Power and bring them to bear in a coordinated, synchronized manner to achieve the effects the President has outlined. As a result, applying smart power in an attempt to influence circumstances in Pakistan in favor of U.S. national interests emerges as a more viable option.
Smart Power is neither soft (the ability to attract people to our side without coercion) nor hard (enables countries to wield carrots and sticks to get what they want)…it is the skillful combination of both. Smart Power is dependent on developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve objectives by drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand U.S. influence and establish the legitimacy of the American action.
We accomplish smart power by concentrating our efforts in several critical areas that include building stake holder alliances, partnerships, and incentivizing the building of institutions. Smart power also encourages global development through a unified approach, establishes public diplomacy that improves access to international knowledge and economic integration that increases the benefits of trade for all people and finally, bringing it all together through the use of, technology and innovation addressing climate change and energy insecurity.
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Breaking the paradigm of using traditional power based models will be difficult because of biases that are forged in historical examples and political agendas that create obstacles. There are three main obstacles that hinder the synchronization of national power to enable the employment of soft power. First, is that U.S. Foreign policy as it has tended to over rely on hard power because it's the most direct visible source of American strength. Second, U.S. Foreign policy is still struggling to develop soft power instruments. Third, U.S. Foreign policy institutions are fractured and compartmentalized.
To paraphrase a quote from President Obama's speech that he gave at West Point in December of 2009 as he was providing the way ahead in Afghanistan for the American people he articulated in order to achieve the goals in Afghanistan we need a stronger, smarter and comprehensive strategy. Smart power provides the framework for both civilian and military leaders to develop options with the most flexibility for the U.S.
and all other regional stake holders. Option two takes a "soft power" / "benign school of thought" approach with
Pakistan by continuing with current policy and international agreements between stakeholders within the region. The policy must reinforce our vital national interest, but does so by becoming more inclusive and collaborative with our regional partners that share like interest pertaining to the security and economic situation and opportunities within Pakistan. We must continue to communicate intent with regional stakeholders, apply diplomatic pressure and insist on the accountability of resources from an international perspective, while simultaneously not compromising Pakistan's sovereignty, or infringing on Pakistan's national security interests by micromanaging Pakistani military or civilian operations. 43 The option requires no real change to our engagement strategy and current policy. Although this option is the least intrusive, the principle risk remains linked to the ability of Pakistan's security apparatus to effectively defeat terror groups that operate from within their border, and to effectively engage Afghanistan after our combat force withdraw.
Option three applies the principle of "smart power" provides the U.S. the most flexibility considering that we do not truly have an indication of how the Pakistanis and NATO will respond once U.S. combat forces have withdrawn from Afghanistan. Our policy must put the U.S. and all other regional stake holders in a position that enables a constant and respectable oversight of programs and security operations that will influence the region. Pakistan must demonstrate an enduring commitment to the defeat of terror organizations in the region, and recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan in order to keep the U.S. funding stream intact. If the Pakistanis do not become the regional leader that we collectively expect, then international stake holders will be in position to apply political, economical, and military pressure to ensure compliance. The risk associated with this option is a misinterpretation of U.S. current policy or an event that would lead to an inconsistent stakeholder response. 44 This would allow terror organizations and other negative influencers in the region to reemerge and gain leverage with a perceived fledgling Pakistan government. Strongly recommend developing option three.
Conclusion
Regardless of the option selected a common theme applicable to all options is that we must assume that Pakistan will muddle along for the next seven to ten years.
The United States needs to remain engaged with all stakeholders, while taking a firm approach that deters regional non-state actors from taking actions that intervene in Afghanistan's and Pakistan's internal matters. The U.S should continue to provide military assistance and encourage international organizations and institutions to provide additional financial resources. 45 No policy is designed to solve all of Pakistan's problems or turn their economic situation around within the near term. But they aim to give the Pakistanis a stake in their country's future and undercut the appeal of insurgency.
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